

RICHARD SHIFF

Manual Imagination

At each instant, our present infinitely contracts our past.... What, in fact, is a sensation? It is the operation of contracting trillions of vibrations onto a receptive surface. Quality emerges from this, quality that is nothing other than contracted quantity.... There is a correlation between life and matter, between expansion [material quantity] and contraction [living quality].
Gilles Deleuze¹

Something is being described through the work itself, through a kind of manual imagination. There are people who can make theoretical constructions.... But I'm painting pictures.... I can't step outside that process and construct an objective account of the pictures.... The paintings are ... projections, they take me places.
Terry Winters²

By projection, an artist gets from here to there and beyond, somewhere. "Paintings take me places," Terry Winters says, pondering the passive consequence of his active creativity. Projection, whether mechanically with a lens or imaginatively with a picture, expands contracted sensation in the form of an image, in time as much as in space, giving sensation a sense of direction.³ Where projective painting actually leads is not something Winters believes he fully controls. Despite his expertise, his application of "manual imagination" is more bodily intuition than technical know-how. He looks to his art for "a visualization or actualization of the virtual... an expanded picture of the unconscious."⁴ This notion of a pictorial unconscious has its complications: on the one hand, painting offers access to the unconscious, an exposure; on the other hand, it brings material extension to whatever area of the unconscious it enters. Painting invents the unconscious, finding it and making it in a single movement.⁵

Winters frequently refers to expansion, extension, projection, multiple dimensions, the virtual, the actual; and he seems ambivalent concerning the use of active or passive voice to describe an artist's experience, as if painting could never secure this distinction.⁶ He is too consistent about all of this for it to be dismissed as quirky. Recently, his predilections may have received

a boost in motivation. In the mid-1990s he discovered the philosophical writings of Gilles Deleuze, which had the uncanny effect of showing him virtual realities and imaginative places he had already visited.⁷ If Winters's painting was picturing the unconscious, then Deleuze was writing it. Until his death in 1995, he was prominent among those intellectual explorers who "make theoretical constructions"—an alternative means of projection that affords entry into the same places artists go. Deleuze's discursive prose fails to terminate in the structured understanding that philosophical argument ordinarily aims to establish. To Winters, this was no shortcoming. He never expected to receive from Deleuze or any other writer a definitive, "objective account" of the experience of painting. Instead, when reading Deleuze, he recognized a painter-to-writer affinity, confirmed by the sense of an artist-to-artist bond.

INFLECT

Deleuzian theory turns from vertical, "arborescent" hierarchies of value to move within a horizontal, "rhizomatic" system of multidirectional exchange: "The rhizome connects any point to any other point.... A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle."⁸ Many roots turning every which way are better than one privileged, radical source, Deleuze argued, expressing an ideological orientation hardly unusual among intellectuals of his generation. Yet, to attribute a particular orientation to Deleuze runs counter to his attitude. He would prefer to speak of an "assemblage" of ideas by multiple links and overlaps, a pattern of thought by no means as orderly as an ideology, a politics, or a science.⁹ To put it another way, his theory itself had a rhizomatic inflection. Perhaps this was only a bias, a bent, an inclination.

Theories, forms, thoughts, and sensations, all in communication (like people in conversation), inflect one another. The verb *inflect* signifies a movement—a turn, bend, or curve—that can be either a transitive or an intransitive action. Drawings have inflection, just as verbal statements do. An inflected line may seem to turn of its own accord, assuming its particular nature (intransitive inflection). Or it may appear to turn because of the effect of other lines in its vicinity, or because of some other feature of the context or medium (transitive inflection).



Terry Winters
Location Plan, #28, 1999
 From a series of 30 drawings
 Ink on vellum
 11 1/2 x 16 1/2 in. (29.2 x 41.6 cm)
 The Judith Rothschild Foundation, New York

Terry Winters
Crystal Lattice, 1994
 Graphite on paper
 10 1/8 x 14 1/4 in. (27.6 x 37.5 cm)
 Private collection; courtesy of Galerie Frick, Lyon, France

When a draftsman's strokes follow upon each other, bending to a collective rhythm as in the conventional representation of a wave, they may acquire this second sense of inflected movement. But with pattern or rhythm, we never know whether one line induces the next into the sequence, or, to the contrary, each is an independent iteration, revealing its character, which by a coincidence of influences takes a form closely resembling that of the neighboring lines. Winters is fascinated by diagrammatic lines that build into patterns, as in *Meshworks*, 10, 2000 (p. 116), or evolve into more complicated graphic motifs, as in *Location Plan*, #28, 1999. Such lines seem to join planar extension to volumetric dimension and lead the artist to the edge of his controlling and his being controlled. Winters inflects his line, but the nature of his drawing instrument and the character of his evolving surface of lines lends to that movement a different inflection—inflection upon inflection, active and passive, directions taken but not definitively.

Winters's line is a test of Deleuzian theory. This is not an idle observation. The conjecture is worth pursuing not only because of Winters's enthusiasm for Deleuze, but also because the painter has been involved with projects that link bodies of writing to graphic images. In these instances, text has not been used to explain image, nor has image been used to illustrate text; if so, we would be dealing with a condition of intellectual reflection rather than with a more physical and emotional inflection. Winters provided both image and text for two of his recent book projects, *Ocular Proofs*, 1995, and *Intersections and Animations*, 1999. He gleaned his textual material from notebooks recording his thoughts along with fragments of others' writings. For a third project, *Perfection, Way, Origin*, 2001, he collaborated with the literary scholar Jean Starobinski. The title of Starobinski's text made Winters "cringe a little" because his art is never so complete as to be perfected; and, although many of his images may have sources (for example, in medical illustration or computer graphics), they grow away from such origins rather than toward them.¹⁵ Neither origin nor end is Winters's concern. Instead, he paints the rhizomatic middle term, the "way"—and painting in turn takes him places. Starobinski states that "every work ... is only a way... It has no power to be

more than this movement."¹¹ Ways and movements are inflections of alternative ways and movements.

One of the Deleuzian ways that especially impressed Winters was the form of *A Thousand Plateaus*, which the philosopher co-authored with psychoanalyst Félix Guattari. They called the separate sections of their book "plateaus" rather than chapters, to suggest not only boundlessness but also the possibility of reading the sections in any sequence. They intended their book to lack "culmination and termination points, [for] a plateau is always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end ... plateaus that communicate with one another across microfissures, as in a brain."¹² Here, writing was mimicking living thought, rather than stabilizing a process of thought by imposing an order, which would be alien to a mind's meanders. Plateaus operate like the tissues of a brain or the layered renderings of a drafting process. Having shifted to one layer, the imaging process can move back again. Plateaus move thought along, complicating it like the successive screens of computer imaging or—more germane to the case of Winters—like the coats of paint and traces of graphite that record every moment of an artist's effort: "keep moving, even in place, never stop moving," write Deleuze and Guattari.¹³ Plateaus are layers touching and inflecting other layers, limitlessly, just as the thinly drawn lines within *Location Plan*, #28 interact with the thickened globular forms, the two incompatible configurations becoming at once obscured, opened, and energized. Because a plateau has neither privileged direction nor fixed order, no process assumes a satisfying end on its plane. A plateau keeps going: it gets somewhere, yet never to climax.¹⁴

To write plateaus (chapters without resolution) is to apply a theory, the Deleuze-Guattari theory. To cement their theory, the authors allowed an exception to it. They committed *A Thousand Plateaus* to a relatively conventional conclusion, "which," they advise, "should be read at the end."¹⁵ In Winters's terms, any theory amounts to a "product of cognition," the kind of directed thinking that sets "boundaries" one would do better to be without. Certain features of *A Thousand Plateaus* do suggest that it results in a boundary statement: not only its summarizing

conclusion, but also its numerous references to sources. It displays its citational credentials and argues with the authorities just like an academic text.¹⁶ Before Winters became seriously involved with Deleuzian formulations, he had warned that a living world can have no firm ground in reference and no finite summation, because it has no real boundaries.¹⁷ Neither does a plateau, Deleuze might have replied. A plateau leads everywhere. A summation of plateaus is not a total, nor an end or resolution, but a continuing, nonlinear series. The limitation that Deleuze's theory sets to thought can only be a no-boundary condition, a boundary permeable in its entirety.¹⁸ The philosopher's conception parallels his notion that sensation is a contraction of lifeless physical matter, potentially encompassing everything, but (because living and therefore evolving) never in stable form. Deleuze's writing anchors thought and feeling no more securely than Winters's painting, which explodes living sensation into multiple layers of physical substance. Multiplicity is the painter's way. "Theories can be constricting," Winters warns, "and I want my paintings to remain open."¹⁹ Deleuzian theory is the one he welcomes, an anti-theory with no effective closure.

SUBLIME

Winters has never shied away from showing signs of the effort he expends and the ambivalence he feels at every moment as he develops a canvas. The cause of ambivalence is experimentation; any given mark may succeed; any given mark may fail. One of his characteristic types of line, slightly jagged and seeming to retrace itself as it goes along—as in the arcing, horizontal bands of *Crystal Lattice*, 1994—manifests this double inclination, now forward, now backward, to the left, to the right, every way. Winters's line extends time as well as space, moving quickly and slowly at once. Its forms lead to others of related kinds, to relations not otherwise manifest. Life has its vicissitudes; our thoughts and emotions wander. And so must art.


By his own account, Winters attempts to make his marks as directly as possible, and often as speedily as possible. He wanders with determination. This is especially true of certain series that employ a fixed format of relatively modest dimensions, such as the 125 drawings titled

Computation of Chains, 1995/96, and the 100 paintings titled *Set Diagram*, 2000–2002. Each work in the latter series spans one meter by one yard, dimensions Winters selected because of their straightforward acceptance as culturally sanctioned and entirely conventional (that is, uninflected by personal choice).²⁰ Straightforwardness and dispatch nevertheless cannot guarantee direct results. Any contrary indication leading Winters to reassess how a particular drawing or painting is developing is likely to end in half-observed traces. Commitment to directness and speed prevents the artist from removing the record of his creative actions, however tentative they may be. But this practice has more than the liberating character of speed and the economy of expediency behind it. In the predominantly blue painting *Untitled* of 2003 (pp. 156–57), an underlying pattern of pink (or pink and blue) remains exposed. We have no immediate evidence that this exposure is anything other than innocent and unmotivated. The alternative is to regard this remnant of past moments in a chain of sensation as consciously displayed or unconsciously suppressed. Either of the latter responses would harness Winters's art to existing interpretive discourses of personal expression and set limits to his "projection"—where his art can go and the places it can take him, as well as us.²¹ The effect of pictorial conflict or anomaly (the pink intrusion) is most evident toward the top edge of *Untitled*. Winters often works by layering one pattern of marks over another, without modifying the materiality of the initial layer, which might otherwise be done by scraping it down or smoothing it over. When Winters occludes a pattern of marks by simple superposition, the paradoxical result can be that they become all the more manifest, if only (as often happens) as a kind of embossing, a set of ridges and bumps that deflect the color and form of the uppermost layer, perhaps to appear at cross purposes with the image that finally emerges.

What finally emerges? Or rather, what finally emerges when we resist the typical interpretive ploy of exclusion, of referring to a picture as revealing something (its presumed subject) and suppressing most everything else, of promoting a position and refusing others? Consider *Parallel Rendering 1*, 1996 (p. 47). There curving strokes sometimes end abruptly as they intersect with

other bars of color, yet they continue visually as an embossed ghost of a former presence. In another painter's work such an effect might detract from the primary pictorial theme, but for Winters it serves to remove a sense of dominance or singleness of purpose and to raise the level of sensory tension. The "pattern" in *Parallel Rendering 1* is decidedly hard to define, not an unusual condition of Winters's art. His designs are impossibles. They move simultaneously in several directions, having multiple senses that make no (one) sense.²² *Parallel Rendering 1* forms a grid, a mesh, a weave, a set of angles, a set of curves, a spiral, an ellipse and a rectangle, all in a glance. It is thick and thin, dense and airy. When one visual or tactile direction in the work becomes dominant, another intervenes, whether as opposition or merely as modification. Some of the shifts affect our spatial sense; some affect our temporal sense. Each of the many elements of pattern that constitute the one unruly diagram of Winters's painting is a sensory force that impacts on all others. By actively interfering and leaving traces of conflict (the ridges and bumps of a Winters oil painting), each element becomes as much like the others as it can be. The very fact of the material interference and physical contiguity causes all conceivable resemblance to become evident. Rectangles begin to circle, and the curving line goes straight. Yet this happens with every element retaining its material specificity. Interference—over which Winters might claim an unintended mastery—is that tenuous moment at which sameness and difference are equally evident as relational values, as mutual inflection.

Most often, interference in painting occurs when the general motifs and their constituent marks become independently apparent. Here Deleuze's term, and Winters's as well, is "asignifying." Asignifying marks are too assertive to be subordinate to a representational theme or any schematic figuration; they form a material abstraction that no abstract concept or referential sign can encompass.²³ At moments of interference, a viewer recognizes internal forces of change and conflict within the image.²⁴ At the right of *Untitled*, horizontal, smeary strokes fold white into blue to form a zone of coarse streaking. At the left, a more organized pattern of alternating blue and white bands, horizontals that slope



Phase Diagram for water

downward to the right, "expose" or "reveal" (the connotations differ) the traces of blue-and-pink pattern beneath them, a level of order that would seem to have been "suppressed" by the smears of paint at the opposite side. *Expose, reveal, and suppress* are terms that ambiguate empirical understanding and psychic fantasy. They are the interpreter's desperate metaphors, offered to motivate and complete a "pictorial narrative" that has more to do with the felt intensity of experiential time than with telling a repeatable story in abstract time.²⁵ Without failing to create an image that appears whole as a picture, Winters has left *Untitled* moving in many moods, senses, and directions.²⁶ If there is a pattern to his work—whether psychological, biological, or logical—it is a pattern that completes itself only in changing.

Among the various graphic systems and mappings that have fascinated Winters are phase diagrams, which relate the solid, liquid, and gaseous states or phases of a chemical compound to environmental temperature and pressure. The phase diagram for water, for instance, shows those combinations of temperature and pressure at which solid ice becomes vapor without passing through a liquid form. (The technical term for this phenomenon is *sublimation*; for water, it happens only at abnormally low atmospheric pressure, though within a familiar range of temperature.) Each phase diagram has a "triple point" where a certain combination of temperature and pressure causes all three states of the same substance to be present simultaneously. The triple point is a counter-intuitive "fact" of nature, unstable even in concept, and its presence is unlikely to be observed empirically without utter confusion. Perhaps it should be called a multiple-singular event, that is, an impossibility. Imagine passing through a maze of ice, water, and vapor, with the one elemental substance shifting in every way between its phases of solid, liquid, and gas; a vaporous opening might suddenly become a solid wall (here the technical term is *deposition*, a gas becoming a solid). The linear form of a phase diagram indicates, nevertheless, that the triple point is very real, whether or not a person ever experiences it outside of its diagrammatic image. It exists as a figure, an abstraction, a set of coordinates, a thought. Once the phases of matter begin to acquire their graphic form, based on whatever empirical

information can be gathered, it becomes evident that the three phase-transition boundary lines (solid/gas, solid/liquid, liquid/gas) must connect at some point. This is the triple point, a truth of rendering.²⁷

Winters works at the "triple point" of pictorialism, at the point of maximum dedifferentiation and interference. His graphic forms occupy the counterintuitive join of conflicting phases and forces, an area of the greatest intensity and instability. How does the triple point play out in a particular work? The 1996 drawing *Animation* is a mazelike network of charcoal, graphite, and oil (p. 63); a circular motif dominates and paradoxically converts into a rectilinear grid. (In the language of phase transitions, the circularity "sublimes" into the grid.) If there is a "circle," its actualization is not quite established; implied by thick curving lines, it is nowhere completed. In fact, its curve becomes indistinguishable from a wave phase. The transitional wave within *Animation* consists of clusters of undulating curves, which, because they bend a little too abruptly here and there, appear to curve themselves into angles. Winters's line has induced curves to inflect angles, and angles to inflect curves. (Here, *inflect* is both transitive and intransitive.) Now imagine that the circle implied by the broadest of the dark marks in *Animation* is a "solid." The less heavy, wavy lines become its "liquid" phase, while the more slender, diffuse lines of the grid or mesh constitute an enveloping "gas." Although grossly metaphorical, this description respects the transitional, plateaulike multiplicity of Winters's forms. His environmental magic trick is to have suspended these phases or forms in their state of becoming-each-other, that is, at what could be called their triple point, their point of maximum mutual interference. At the triple point a round circle inflects to become a curving yet angled wave (it "melts"); but it also, just as directly, becomes a rectilinear grid (it "sublimes"). These transformations are not contradictory, but Deleuzian—"unconscious" contractions and expansions of graphic form that correspond to sensations at the very edge of consciousness. Winters further complicated matters by adding strokes of yellow, which reinforce some lines to the exclusion of others. The yellow pulls those lines illusionistically forward, affecting the implied spatial level at which any

given line or segment of pattern may lie. He left *Animation* so very animated that familiar senses of pictorial order and disorder, construction and chaos, cannot hold.

SENSE

Given time to inspect *Untitled, Parallel Rendering 1*, and *Animation* (to peel them back, as it were, spatially and temporally), we might determine that the physical layers of color and the textured strokes that structure these works assume a precise sequence from bottom to top, from then to now. None of the works, however, developed its present appearance as the result of hierarchical ordering. The logic of sequence, the obliteration of the past by the present, has no power over Winters's art. None of his layers of effort tolerates being subordinated to any other effort. The layers, sets of marks, and phases of each of his paintings fold into a single sensation to generate an image as if from inside itself. Questions of origin, source, and external reference become academic; they fail to bear on the sensory, the emotional, and even the intellectual import of Winters's work.²⁸ To sense the work is to stay within it, just as the artist did in making it. Like certain plastics and fabrics, and also the human brain, a painting can have its own material memory. The present of the work "infinitely contracts [its] past"; its living quality "is nothing other than contracted quantity" (this is Deleuze thinking back to Bergson, not forward to Winters).²⁹

Accordingly, Winters frequently recalls a layer from the tactile bottom to the visual top of a painting; he accomplishes this by direct, physical action, scraping or scratching down to the fundament. The dominant formal motif of *Scale*, 2003 (pp. 148–49), is a product of this technique. Another example is *Set Diagram 69*, 2001 (p. 105), where broad planes of yellow, having been obliterated by layers of gray (various combinations of black and white), reappear as yellow lines incised into the thick skin of gray paint. Winters's incisions and scrapings create the figure of a spoked wheel, visually superimposed over a ground of two sets of horizontal bars. The horizontals are themselves out of sync: an upper set drops slightly downward to the left; a lower set drops slightly downward to the right. Nothing indicates that this "background" variation has an

external reference, despite the "foreground" wheel. The variation may simply have resulted from the directness and speed of the artist's paint application. Winters has no theory to guide such actions on the plateau of his canvas or paper surfaces. In fact, no theory is needed, for his actions are their own guide. The painter expands the sensation contracted within him, working it out in pigment as the pigment moves, perhaps to contract sensation once again in its altered state. Painting breathes: expansion, contraction, expansion, contraction.

Winters's painted images are free to be decisive but also free to drift. Often they drift from one medium into another, as if the transfer of medium (say from painting to etching, or even small-format drawing to large-format drawing) were analogous to layering within a single work. With drift, direction can shift back and forth, ever inflected. Winters's *Computation of Chains* series, begun 1995, and the related imagery of *Graphic Primitives*, 1998, exist as drawings, paintings, etchings, computer prints, and woodcuts. He has taken hand-rendered images and processed them through a computer algorithm: "I wanted to see what this sort of naked complexity would look like, where there was an evenness to a line, without the benefit of inflection." And then he has returned the seemingly neutralized, digital picture to hand-work, "back to a physical density."³⁰ Yet "naked complexity" is itself a gradient of inflection on an ever-evolving continuum of graphic form. In recognition of a multiplicity of phases of the "naked," Winters has included among his drawing instruments ball-point, roller-ball, and felt-tip pens.³¹ These devices generate lines far removed from the aesthetics of traditional steel-point, pen-and-ink inflection, yet still record turns of the wrist and variations in applied pressure. Deleuze, too, drifted—topic to topic, plateau to plateau. His philosophical subjects ranged from the "logic of sense" or perceived meaning (master of nonsense, Lewis Carroll) to the "logic of sensation" or perceived feeling (master of paint, Francis Bacon). Well before Winters was aware of Deleuze, the writer had developed his own version of a "manual" imagination, spurred by Bacon's example. The manual aspect of painting brings about a "veritable insubordination of the

hand," Deleuze stated in 1981. "The painting remains a visual reality, but what is imposed on sight is a space without form and a movement without rest."³² Winters's sense of manual restlessness derives not from Bacon's dissolution of representation and abstraction but from the analogous activity of Willem de Kooning. Testing out models of professionalism during his early years as an artist, Winters was impressed by photographs of de Kooning in his studio, dressed like a workman, a house painter.³³ De Kooning was a connoisseur of paint, its physical substance, not its finished, textbook style. He surrounded himself with the material traces of his creative imagination, a new stylistic sense or direction. His style sedimented in the many papers he would use to imprint or "pull" the record of an image in process, as if to keep layers of sensation available for material use in any conceivable sequence. De Kooning's hand appeared to lead him into disorder as much as into order. Through the signs of this ingenuity, Winters understood from the beginning of his career that art could never diverge from craft: it evolved through a medium and the skillfully inventive, even playful, use of materials and tools. The risks associated with artistic practice developed not only from the resolve to follow one's imagination, but also from the fact that no amount of experience would prevent the materials and tools from continuing to assert their independent will. If, by Deleuzian logic, conscious sensation is contracted matter, then materials have at least a touch of consciousness. "I've created the image," Winters reports, "but at the same time, I'm not in total control. My approach is to build a series of improvisational responses, a set of operating procedures... a practice."³⁴

In fact, de Kooning's fame related both to his phenomenal manual control and to practices that would cause his skilled hand to slip as it met material resistance. He intuited that materials are never to be mastered, but rather to be engaged. During the 1960s, he sometimes drew the human figure while keeping his eyes closed, having manual imagination alone to guide him: "I feel my hand slip across the paper. I have an image in mind but the results surprise me. I always learn something new from this experience.... When I am slipping, I say, 'Hey, this is very interesting!'"³⁵ De Kooning was being



Francis Bacon (United Kingdom, 1909–92)
Painting, 1946.
Oil and tempera on canvas
48 7/8 x 61 1/2 in. (123 x 105.5 cm)
The Museum of Modern Art, New York

taken somewhere—by his materials and by himself. From outside the process, Deleuze similarly referred to a painter's hand as insubordinate. As if forced by material conditions to slip, it generated a "diagram-accident... scamb[ing] the intentional figurative form."³⁸ Deleuze's example, of course, was not de Kooning but Bacon. The works of both artists demonstrate how deeply a painter's hand extends into the process of thought, as the thinking and sensing body becomes one with the gesture of its appendage, controlled or not. The body must think what the hand shows it ("painting... takes me places"). But it also seems to a great extent that whatever the hand accomplishes must have been willed. Artistic hands are not spastic. Would the willing be conscious or unconscious? De Kooning insisted that his results surprised him. His paintings of the 1970s, which Winters especially admires, bring disparate layers to a single surface, exposing disjunctive moments within the painter's process. We might consider these enfolded, dissociated surfaces as plateaus of the unconscious. The eruption of pink within the blue of Winters's own *Untitled* of 2003 recalls the de Kooning effect. Winters remains the one who painted this anomalous element, while the prevailing order too is his. Everything that slips into the picture is his, by conscious or unconscious design, conscious or unconscious accident. Yet the sense slips away. Otherwise there would be little need to keep painting; any single work would immediately tell all.

The cause of Winters's attraction to Deleuze extends beyond the philosopher's concern for painting and his independent way of theorizing the manual. Deleuze as a writer manifests a certain insubordination, just as Bacon (or de Kooning, or Winters) does as a painter. Winters states that the multiple, indeterminate form of Deleuze's argumentation is what he initially found so appealing. In addition, Deleuze had a penchant for thinking planometrically: conceiving differences in terms of lines, spaces, diagrams, and visual figures. As much as he advocated disarticulation, he often set his layers of conceptual abstraction into metric Euclidean order—for example, associating one notion with surface, a related one with angle, still another with point.³⁹ Ultimately, however, this characterization of Deleuze's structure of thought loses its appropriateness; for when he diagrams, he is more



Hans Namuth (Germany 1915–90 United States)
Willem de Kooning, 1968
Galatin silver print
Center for Creative Photography,
The University of Arizona

Willem de Kooning (Netherlands 1904–97 United States)
Untitled IV, 1977
Oil on canvas
80 x 70 in. (203.2 x 177.8 cm)
The Menil Collection, Houston;
gift of Adelaide de Menil Carpenter

the adventurous topologist than the steady geometer. Topological configurations can be twisted, stretched, and compressed into new shapes; and yet the surface properties that the science of topology recognizes as crucial may remain unaffected. To the measuring eye of the geometer, the same configurations will have fundamentally changed. When the circle becomes the wave and the grid, and when the grid becomes the wave and the circle—all on the single pictorial surface of Winters's *Animation*—the geometry of the drawing has attained topological flexibility. On the metric scale, it registers as decidedly nonmetric, that is, not subject to ordinary rules of measure.⁴⁰ Deleuze, who died the year before *Animation* was created, would have taken strong interest.

Planometric: What might this term indicate, were we to think freely on the nonmetric plateau of Deleuze-becoming-Winters and Winters-becoming-Deleuze? The notion may at first seem anti-Deleuzian. *Planometric*: extending one's thought on a plane. *Planometric*: marking out a measured direction on the plane. Yet, things planometric also meander; their direction cannot be specified. The planometric artist is free to zigzag, just as free to go straight; free to use an inflected line (like Winters in his drawings), just as free to disinflect through a computer algorithm (like Winters in others of his drawings). In English, the prefix *plano* has a double derivation and a double meaning. From its root in Greek, it signifies a wandering movement; from its root in Latin, it signifies the quality of being a surface, of having planarity.⁴¹ The Deleuzian theory of the plateau is planometric in both senses, and so is Winters's practice. Both writer and painter comprehend life and thought as a complex graphic order, and both encourage wandering. (Deleuze refers to nomadism and "nomad art."⁴²) For the wanderer to remain at the surface will be sufficient. Deleuze suggests that a planar surface is material depth infinitely extended in the horizontal dimension; surfaces therefore level off all pretenses to hierarchical profundity.⁴³ Winters is enough of a traditionalist to figure images of depth on paper and canvas, as if to reveal a potential of the surface, any surface, that would otherwise remain inapparent. To his eye, all surfaces encompass depth. The skewed rhomboids and meshlike forms of *Scale* imply depth without entering it definitively, either by illusionistic perspective or by

physical incision. Yet, inscribed lines constitute the dominant graphic figure. *Scale* straddles the several conceptualized categories and boundary conditions that Winters is exploring.

Accordingly, Winters's interest in the flat has never prevented him from rendering the twist of a volume in space. *Turbulence Skins/12*, 2002 (p. 143), a very dense image, as well as the less dense *Turbulence Skins/35*, 2002 (p. 145), are linear structures that look as if they might be describing ribbed, partially flattened spheres, cylinders, or cans. It is a type of form to which Winters seems inclined. The lines may correspond to structural members of an actual physical object, but more likely they trace the kinds of diagrammatic forces seen also in *Scale*. "My approach is diagrammatic," the artist announces; "each image becomes a superposition of maps."¹⁴ Like phase diagrams, maps interpolate and extrapolate as much as they graph what has already been experienced. Lines project conditions that might exist, either as something unknown or as a variant of something known. Painting and drawing live in this curious state of becoming—becoming apparent and inapparent at once: "As recording instrument [tracking the known] and experimental device [projecting the unknown], drawing can make things 'unhidden.'" Once unhidden, virtualities come into view. They are to be sensed, but perhaps not distinctly. "Invent, test and play," Winters says.¹⁵ Slip a bit, advised de Kooning.

Like Deleuze, Winters is willing to overturn long-standing intellectual habits. He takes comfort in proceeding by testing and playing, without being compelled to articulate a definite goal. Asked about his sustained interest in Deleuze's writings, he implies that this is conceptual material he would never presume to have mastered, something to be tested out like a graphic tool. He reads Deleuze sympathetically, but "no," he says only half facetiously, "I don't think it makes sense to me."¹⁶ Deleuzian theory holds thinking so close to the limits of sense that it resembles drawing and painting, ever unresolved, never reaching climax. Pursuing thoughts about surfaces, Deleuze writes that "everything happens at the border," the edge of where you are.¹⁷ When Winters pages through Deleuze, he recognizes in turn that an argument extended through the medium of words contracts into a sensation

like a unified image emerging from the extended lines and colors of a picture: "Drawing is the prototype—the first time the image is seen... Signs are generated to be felt and sensed."¹⁸ Configured signs contract or encompass the levels of experience that both Winters's drawings and Deleuze's texts also expand. It is in this context that Winters speculates about art and the unconscious. As we know, he wonders whether a drawing or painting might best be regarded "as a visualization or actualization of the virtual... an expanded picture of the unconscious." Art renders the unconscious unhidden, always for the first time. It invents (finds and makes, makes and finds).

Anyone who has drawn a line realizes from the experience how immediate it is. You follow along with the line as much as you lead it to where you want it to go—or think you want yourself to go. Are you extending the line? Or does it extend you? Perhaps it contracts you, draws your attention down to a point, the point of the stylus that draws the line. There may be no purpose to theorizing the sensation of line that everyone already feels with intimacy. But what can Winters's line be drawing when it extends beyond the closed volume that the image in *Turbulence Skins/35* approximates—when radial forms violate the outer ring, or when the line of circumference doubles itself at the bottom edge of the figure? Does the "extra" line of this doubling amount to a corrective measure? Or does it signify an additional structural member of the form, which, in fact, features internal repetition? Given the flow of the medium, can such a drawn volume actually ever be "closed," complete in itself, adequately drawn, or sufficiently corrected? It seems that the aesthetic charge of an image becomes strongest (unhidden?) precisely where the hand loses control or acts willfully, when it senses its situation and responds to it, becoming self-conscious about the evolving process of drawing. This is the point at which any hesitation, any brief moment of reflection, raises a counterflow of undecidable questions. It is where Deleuze's manual insubordination and Winters's manual imagination enter the picture. Winters says, "I can't step outside [the painting] process and construct an objective account." Nor can we. To make conscious sense of drawing and painting, to keep sense moving, the painter simply continues to paint. A wary critic but savvy viewer joins the line.

SWITCH

... induce spontaneous phenomena ... make something happen ...

Terry Winters¹⁹

Sense, understanding, is not the resolution of thought but its direction. Like a line, thought moves; this is its nature. To grasp a present situation, we need no more than sense that things are coming and that they are going. Living does not require a fixed image of the totality of its conditions; and, in any case, such an image would amount to a false picture of stability in an individual's state of being. "You arbitrarily define the present as that which is," Henri Bergson wrote in a passage Deleuze cites, "whereas the present is simply what becomes, whatever is in the process of being made."²⁰ In the same spirit, Winters replies extemporaneously when asked why he works as he does, and what it all might mean for his feeling of life:


Living in the present is always a sense [of] becoming... The paintings have been less and less about some very fixed notion of identity... The work is really about contingencies and the pragmatics of making things, and making do with things that are in the world. The application is towards a very practical, pragmatic, daily thinking... [To] make things and become."

The meaning, the sense, the direction that phenomena acquire, is the sense of becoming. An artist starts somewhere (many places) and causes "that which is" to come alive, to become. As Winters has said, "Paintings are projections. They take me places" (many places). He makes "something happen" by a process he calls "pragmatic negotiations."²¹ In his more colloquial moments, he simply refers to "making do" with the given conditions, both psychic and material. Does he also "induce spontaneous phenomena"? Why do both kinds of phrasing occur to Winters as he thinks about the sense of painting and drawing? The same question arises from thinking about thinking. Is it, in fact, proper to speak of notions of causality and spontaneity as occurring to Winters, as if he actively thought them? Or do these thoughts happen to him, as if he were instead their directed object, not their directing subject? Winters

states that he makes his abstract paintings in order to "build something real." But the sensory reality that shows itself through painting is never something Winters knew in another material existence. Nor is it a form of his preexisting fantasy world. Then where was it, and where is it? Does it come out of nowhere? Like a triple point, it occupies many places: here, there, and neither here nor there.

Recently Winters made two graphite drawings that feature the inscription "ENTER" within a motif of concentric circles: *Sketchbook Pages #29*, 2001, and *Sketchbook Pages III, #6*, 2002, to which the central buttonlike form of the oil painting *Untitled (Red)*, 2003 (p. 151), may bear some relation. In the two drawings, the set of diminishing circles connotes a change in scale, dimension, or level, and within the central circle, the height of the lettering decreases slightly from the midpoint to both left and right, as if the represented surface were convex. Winters states that he was thinking of "pushing a button to enter some kind of other space." These images may be approaching as explicit a theory as the artist allows. His circles become a suggestive vortex leading to a higher or deeper level, while the convex button, the projective means of entry, beckons to be touched. *Sketchbook Pages III, #6* shows the button at two different positions, as if switching. It is a push-push switch: push for "enter"; push again for "exit." Winters's "other space," entered with a push, may well be the unconscious, contracting and expanding like a present and a past, passing freely between different phases of time and space.

By manual action, a button can activate a phase transition; and by manual imagination, the graphic drawing of a button can do the same. Given our culture's industrial past—contracted within our postindustrial present—button-pushing is a powerful metaphor for an immediate change in conditions, both physical and emotional. At the push or pull of a toggle, dial, knob, or button, we routinely switch on a source of illumination, heating, or cooling. We operate a control panel of buttons and switches to set any number of processes in motion. When everything is working, we worry vaguely over someone pushing a nuclear or WMD button. Children of recent generations encountered the power of buttons



and switches as a basic feature of the typical industrialized home: "Don't ever touch that," a parent warns. Like others, Winters grew up understanding that the miraculous binary operation of switches corresponds to the manual physicality of pushing and pulling, turning and rotating, flipping and flicking. Any child can do it. A variant of the device that turns on the lights now operates our advanced information systems. It has been miniaturized, too tiny for unmediated hands to control.

At some point in recent technological history, electro-mechanical and electronic switches became more familiar than purely mechanical ones. On the near side of this transition, the single-button, push-push type (like Winters's "ENTER," as opposed to the push-pull type) comes into its own. Touching the push-push button simply activates whatever procedure negates the previous one or is programmed to follow it in a predetermined sequence. With push-push, neither mechanical nor spatial orientation differentiates "on" from "off." As with phase transition, no stable barrier need be crossed in moving from one state ("on") to the alternative ("off"); the two states just follow each other, as if arbitrarily. At the phase boundary where ice sublimates into vapor, vapor is equally likely to deposit into ice. This, at least, is how it will seem to the human observer, unable to sense any prevailing direction—if there should be one—in minute shifts in temperature and pressure. Instead of push-push, some single-button switches are more properly called engage-release or push-to-make; they have distinguishable "in" and "out" positions that correspond to "on" and "off" but require constant application to activate ("Shift" and "Ctrl" and "[Apple]" on a computer keyboard). Other engage-release switches move only to alter whatever function they control and have been designed to resume their initial state immediately ("Num Lock"). Still others of the single-button type are activated by the mere contact of touch and do not move at all.

Push-push and engage-release switches have no origin, ground, orientation, or perfected end. They only facilitate. Each is a way. They establish nothing but the difference that engagement or connection makes. The switch itself, as well as its operation, signifies "change"

Terry Winters
Sketchbook Pages #29, 2001
Graphite on paper
14 x 18 in. (35.6 x 45.7 cm)
Collection of the artist

Terry Winters
Sketchbook Pages III, #6, 2002
Graphite on paper
14 1/8 x 18 1/8 in. (37.1 x 46 cm)
Courtesy of Matthew Marks Gallery, New York

rather than any specific change. It may not indicate what it does, but it does do something. It projects you somewhere. And this is what Winters intended his "ENTER" to do, along with his other abstractions and diagrammatic signs. Consider the somewhat amorphous ellipsoids distributed across Winters's painting *Standardgraph/4*, 2003 (pp. 140–41). Call them "amorphoids"—shapes that lose form while gaining it and gain form while losing it. Each amorphoid is a microcosmic variant of the dynamic motif of *Animation*: a form that is becoming-circle, becoming-wave, and becoming-grid simultaneously. An environment of circles, waves, and grids in *Standardgraph/4* induces these transitions, these becomings, which were already immanent in the amorphoids. A few months before working on his *Standardgraph* series, Winters wrote: "Emergent becomings are produced according to immanent and transformable conditions."¹¹

If the push-push switch removes definitive direction from the experience of change, another type of electro-mechanical device, the heat-sensitive or thermal switch, creates the conditions for a phase transition in the body's intervening sensory system. For anyone accustomed to associating switches with touch, pressure, and the focused exercise of a certain small amount of force (linked in turn to every past experience of weight, momentum, resistance, and gravity), heat-sensitive operations mystify because they require no pressure, only contact. They depend on a passive factor involved in every human touch: body temperature. Usually functionally inactive in the external world, body temperature hides from self-sensation. People are unlikely to be aware that they are operating heat-sensitive switches until the finger's "touch" abandons them. If a person presses an elevator button with gloved hands on an unusually cold day, the chilled gloves can prevent the body's warmth from reaching the surface. This application of touch fails to convey heat sufficient to register, and a temperature-activated switch does not perform. Such an experience causes a person to feel suddenly without substance, incapable of leaving a physical trace. Under this condition, the switch dematerializes the living experience of touch, as if sensation could no longer contract matter to a body's finger point ("Sensation... contract[s] trillions of vibrations onto a receptive surface," Deleuze wrote). Seeming to lack all weight, pressure, and

presence, the hand no longer inflects. Like pushing a pen with no ink, or pulling a brush with no paint, applying more force to the temperature-activated button accomplishes nothing. "Painting is a circuit, a feedback loop," Winters says.¹² The moment of art comes to this performance of switching when the informational feedback to the body itself switches. Frustration with an elevator button brings the realization that some other "phase" of bodily function is being solicited. Here, insubordination in the material world has put a challenge to manual imagination. A proper reaction is to reorient one's personal phase diagram so that passive temperature now dominates active pressure.

Winters knows that the cultural and technological environment inflects a conscious body in unfamiliar, often hidden ways. This is the problem his art addresses. He is committed to leaving an open physical trace in his painting—scratched lines, worn colors, layers of ridges and bumps—but never assumes that the telling signs of a body's experience are restricted to its self-assuring, habitual mannerisms. There are innumerable modes of touching and of being touched, and each can be a "way" (in the Starobinski/Winters sense) of getting somewhere. Winters has avoided developing a personal mythology and has never cultivated an exclusive, autographic mark.¹³ Something grander than personality is at stake for him: the continuum or "correlation between life and matter" (Deleuze).¹⁴ He wants to know what of life can be sensed through a stylus and graphite, or through a brush and oil paint, as well as through a computer algorithm—what classes of information the various material markings and physical operations register as meaningful evidence. Like a phase diagram, his plateau-pictures convert unsensed information into something "unhidden" (Winters's word).¹⁵ Why "unhidden"? Like an "actualization of the virtual" (Winters again, but Deleuze too), a thing unhidden occupies a phase of matter different from the same thing hidden. It is not that we see something previously unseen, a revelation, but rather that something shows itself in a different way and form. Once manifest, the unhidden thing still changes: all elements of reality are linked even as they differentiate, and collectively they continue to evolve.¹⁶ Inflecting, subliming, sensing, switching, evolving: Winters's pictorial unconscious may not have become unhidden, but un hiding.

NOTES

1. Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Haberman (New York: Zone Books, 1988 [1963]), 74, 103. Deleuze's statement refers to Henri Bergson, *Matière et mémoire* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1968 [1896]), 166–69. It has the advantage of eliminating the conceptual barrier between what is human (consciousness) and what is nonhuman (materiality) so that situations can be described without giving preference to either. Living consciousness and dead matter exist on a continuum, and each can be all-encompassing. This disarticulation of the traditional difference (human/nonhuman) is, more generally, animate/inanimate) has been attractive to those interested in hybrid forms such as cyborgs, robots, and intelligent machines. There has been far more attention given to machines becoming intelligent than to people becoming intelligent, which may be the more pressing social issue. See also Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (London: Continuum, 2003 [1981]), 45. "Sensation is vibration... The body is completely living, and yet nonorganic." Or Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizoanalysis*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987 [1980]), 503. "The organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being anorganic."

2. Terry Winters, "Conversation with Adam Fux," in *Terry Winters: Computation of Chains* (New York: Matthew Marks Gallery, 1997), 9, 14.

3. Coincidentally, projection belongs to the technical language of set diagrams, which graph relations of inclusion and exclusion between sets of properties. Set diagrams and projections give logical abstractions a material face. Between 2000 and 2002, Winters created a series of participatory titled Set Diagrams, often using forms that resemble those of set projections (interlocking circles, ellipses, and other, more complex curvilinear figures).

4. This and other statements, opinions, and recollections attributed to Winters, when given no specific source, derive from a series of conversations with the author between June and December 2003. Winters also states: "Painting can make unconscious patterns visible... The animation develops, and somewhere along the way a connection is made between the and the formal configurations of the work" ("Conversation with Adam Fux," 19).

5. Compare remarks by Jasper Johns, an artist Winters admires: "A painter just paints paintings without a conscious reason... Your thought takes a certain form and you have to follow it" (Jasper Johns, statement to *Newsweek* [published 31 March 1958], interview by Anne Wallace [22 February 1991], in Kirk Varnedoe, ed., *Jasper Johns: Writings, Sketchbook Notes, Interviews* [New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1996], 81, 261). Winters's material, pictorial "unconscious" takes a different, direct link to classical psychoanalysis, whether Freudian or Jungian. Instead he emphasizes

the expansion of unconscious territory—unmapped, unpossessed, an unconscious neither individual nor collective. He art spans things hidden so that they transform into things "unhidden" (as discussed below). What is important is the change itself, which preserves both hidden and unhidden potentials. Winters's "unconscious" does share a feature with its Freudian counterpart: its "content" is likely to emerge as conscious experience in a dissociated manner—manifested as multiplicitous senses, envy, which way.

6. Compare Deleuze's understanding of Bergson's "creative evolution": "There is here no longer any creating whole; there are merely lines of actualization, some conservative, others simultaneous, but each representing an actualization of the whole in one direction... They only actualize by inventing" (Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 100–101 [emphasis in original]). Winters's interest in biological forms and the evolution of life, overtly expressed in his imagery of the 1980s, could be investigated through the Deleuzian inflection of Bergsonism. The present essay deals directly with the artist's related but differently directed concerns of the past decade.

7. On the question of voice, note Winters's frequent use of passive (and sometimes active) in the notebook statements that constitute the text for his book *Ocular Proofs* (New York: Grove/ACF Press, 1995). This may be a rhetorical ploy, a device to remove any effect of authorship or origin: "unseen" tensor fields are produced by simulations; interaction is used in real time.

8. "A friend gave me a copy of *The Fold* (Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993 [1988]) sometime in the mid-nineties. That's when I started to pay attention. Subsequently, I've pretty much looked over all [of Deleuze's] work." Winters suggests that he had previously noticed selections from Deleuze's writing included in anthologies such as *Incorporations*, ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kessler (New York: Zone, 1992), without realizing that these texts might relate to his art. In 2003 he added Francis Bacon: *The Logic of Sensation* to the number of Deleuze's works he had read, but in no case was he seeking particular justification for his own practice. He simply finds Deleuzian thought congenial. Deleuzian interpretations of Winters's art have been developed in Enrique Juncosa, "Thought as Image," *Terry Winters* (Barcelona: ICAAM, London: Whitechapel Art Gallery, 1998), 11–22; John Rachtman, "Painting in the Brain-City," *Terry Winters: Graphic Drawings* (New York: Matthew Marks Gallery, 1999), 7–15; and Harry Cooper, "Drawing and Writing with TW," in Michael Semff, ed., *Terry Winters Zeichnungen/ Drawings* (Munich: Staatliche Graphische Sammlung, 2003), 12–27, 44–45. See also Nan Rosenthal, "Painting What We Can't See," *Terry Winters, Printed Works* (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2001), 28–29.

9. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 21, 25.

10. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 22–23.

10. On Winters's thoughts about perfection, Way, Origin, see Nancy Prinzenthal, "Perfect Like a Hedgehog: The Printed Works of Terry Winters," *Art on Paper 6* (September–October 2001): 50.

11. Jean Starobinski, "Perfection, Way, Origin," trans. Richard Pevar, in *Terry Winters, Perfection, Way, Origin* (West Islip, NY: Universal Limited Art Editions, 2002), n.p. Starobinski eventually argues that perfection, way, and origin "are names of three temporal places" which become one, having been kept separate only by our habits of thought.

12. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 21–22 (order of phrases altered).

13. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 159.

14. Adopting the term plateau, Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 22, 158) cite its use by Gregory Bateson, who referred to the Balinese "method of dealing with quarrels" as "the substitution of a plateau for a climax" (Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* [New York: Random House, 1972], 113).

15. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, xx.

16. This feature becomes the foundation for a critique of Deleuze and Guattari in Christopher J. Miller, "The Postcolonialist Predicament in the Footnotes of *A Thousand Plateaus*: Nomadology, Ontology, and Authority," *Diacritics* 23 (Fall 1993): 6–33.

17. Terry Winters, in Clifford S. Ackley, "Terry Winters and Cliff Ackley: A Conversation," *Art New England* 14 (June–July 1992): 31.

18. Starobinski objects: "One recent critical exaggeration went to see only nomadic apparitions [an allusion to Deleuze's terms nomology], or an infinite text with no edge or outside" ("Perfection, Way, Origin," n.p.).

19. Winters, "Conversation with Adam Fux," 9.

20. In 1977 Winters worked in New Mexico installing Walter de Maria's environmental sculpture *The Lightning Field*, which measures one mile by one kilometer. Winters's predilection for neutral, standard sizes may be related to his experience with de Maria's art.

21. Deleuze would identify these limitations with "significance" and "subjectification," the customary analysis of art and individual human expression by way of semiotics and psychoanalysis; see Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 111–48.

22. On impossibility ("a movement without displacement, internal displacement"), see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind" (1961), in *The Phenomenology of Perception*, ed. James M. Edie, trans. Carleton Dalley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 184–85; and Deleuze, *The Fold*, 59, 80–82, 150 n.3.

23. Compare Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 1–7, 99–102.

24. Compare Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994 [1991]), 214–15. On aspects of interference, see Richard Shiff, "Cézanne's Blur: Approximating Cézanne," in Richard

Thomson, ed., *Framing Francis: Essays on the Representation of Landscape in France, 1870–1914* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1996), 59–80; "Reclaim of Line Resolution: Digitization and Modern Painting," in Terry Smith, ed., *Impossible Presence: Surface and Screen in the Photogram* (Ela Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 124–56. "Puppet and Test Pattern, Mechanicity and Materiality in Modern Pictorial Representation," in Bruce Clarke and Linda Dalrymple Henderson, eds., *From Energy to Information: Representation in Science and Technology, Art, and Literature* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 327–50, 420–26.

25. The phrase "pictorial narrative" is Winters's ("Conversation with Adam Fux," 9). On the subject of time (Atom and Chronos), see Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990 [1969]), 162–68.

26. A floating fragment of an snow or wisp-like motif, seen on the right side of the limited, complicates its relation to the left side, which has an extended (more anchored?) more definite(?) version of the same motif.

27. The fourth phase of matter, plasma (super-high-energy gas), does not enter into an ordinary phase diagram. It has still further outside that part of the physical world accessible to direct sensation. I thank Stephen Coombes, University of Nottingham, and James Lavinia, The University of Texas at Austin, for information on phase diagrams.

28. This is not to deny that sources exist and that Winters keeps them in mind. "Each drawing [of the *Computation of Chains* series] is a synthesis, an image composed from different sources—architectural renderings, medical photographs, computer graphics—as well as from direct observation" (Winters, "Conversation with Adam Fux," 16). Because most of Winters's source material is already in a planar pictorial form, he speaks of his images as having an "isomorphic relationship" rather than a representational relationship to the world... They arise made from the same stuff, and formed by the same processes" (Terry Winters, interview by Nan Rosenthal, 2001, unedited transcript [order of phrases altered], courtesy Nan Rosenthal, Terry Winters, and The Metropolitan Museum of Art).

29. See note 1.

30. Winters, interview by Nan Rosenthal, 2001, unedited transcript.

31. Examples are the drawings for Winters's book *Interactions and Animations* (New York: Dome Editions, 1999).

32. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 155.

33. Concerning de Kooning, see also Terry Winters, symposium statement, 12 October 2002, in *Terry Winters Zeichnungen/ Drawings*, 11.

34. Winters, "Conversation with Adam Fux," 7.

35. Willem de Kooning, interview by Sam Hunter, "De Kooning: Je dessine les yeux fermés," *Galerie Janssen des Arts* 152 (November 1975): 69. out-of-step statement, interview by Michael C. Sonnabend

and Kenneth Saiton, summer 1958, typewritten, Willem de Kooning Foundation, New York (prepared for the film *Sketchbook No. 1: Three Americans—Willem de Kooning, Jackson Pollock, Igor Stravinsky*, directed by Robert Snyder; written by Michael C. Sonnabend; distributed by Time Inc., 1962).

36. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 157.

37. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 159.

38. On music and isomorphism in geometry, see Manuel Delanda, *Intensive Science & Virtual Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2002), 24–26.

39. Deleuze uses the term platonism encompassing both of these senses (for example, Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 506).

40. "There exists a nomadic absolute, as a local integration moving from part to part and constituting smooth [nonhierarchical, differentiatable] space in an infinite succession of linkages and changes in direction" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 494).

41. "As one advances in the story [of Lewis Carroll's *Alice*], the digging and hiding gives way to a lateral sliding from right to left and left to right. The animals below ground [become] secondary, giving way to flat figures which have no thickness. One could say that the old depth having been opened, the surface width" (Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 9 [emphasis in original]).

42. Winters, symposium statement, 11, 43, 48.

43. Terry Winters, in public conversation with Richard Shiff, *The Metropolitan Museum of Art*, New York, 9 September 2001, videotape (courtesy The Metropolitan Museum of Art and Terry Winters). Deleuze (especially with co-author Guattari) employs a polemical, even self-indulgent style, and there may be good reason to notice that sense is being lost. This leaves a critical reader in a bind; see, for example, René Gracq, "Delirium as System" (review of Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Œdipe* [Anti-Œdipus], *Capitalism and Schizoanalysis*, 1972), "To Double Business Bound": *Essays on Literature, Memory, and Anthropology* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 99–100.

44. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 9.

45. Winters, symposium statement, 11.

47. Winters, *Interactions and Animations*, n.p. (Sections 3 and 49).

48. Bergson, *Matière et mémoire*, 166 (my translation). I have expanded Bergson's reflexive verb so far into the epigrammatic English forms become and be made.

49. Winters, in conversation with Shiff, videotape.

50. "Pragmatic" is a common notion, but also has a specifically Deleuzian connotation of operating under conditions of the most open "becomings and multiplicities" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 251).

51. Winters, symposium statement, 11.

52. Winters, "Conversation with Adam Fux," 19.

53. Referring to Winters's work of the 1990s, Lisa Phillips contrasts him to the early Abstract Expressionists: "[He] uses

generic, diagrammatic forms, drawn from preexisting sources [which] have the familiarity of what Johns called 'things the mind already knows'" (Lisa Phillips, "The Self Similes," *Terry Winters* [New York: Whitney Museum of American Art, 1991], 18–19).

54. See note 1.

55. Winters, symposium statement, 11. Winters recalls no particularly clear motivation for selecting this word: "Unhidden" seemed to more accurately convey the open-ended process of image-making. It just seemed more pragmatic than saying something was 'revealed.' Hidden/unhidden could also suggest the implicit/explicit orders of nature described by [physics] David Bohm." Winters refers here to David Bohm, *Wholeness and the Implicate Order* (London: Routledge, 2002 [1980]). In addition, one thinks of the philosophical notion of "unconsciousness" (the usual translation for Martin Heidegger's German term *Unbewusstsein*), but Winters reports that this particular reference has only now become unhidden.

56. See note 5.

68. Winters, symposium statement, 11.

69. Winters, symposium statement, 11.

70. Winters, symposium statement, 11.

71. Winters, symposium statement, 11.

72. Winters, symposium statement, 11.

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